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Jackson v. State: 
PRIOR 
CONVICTIONS 
OF SIMILAR 
CRIMES MAY BE 
ADMISSIBLE FOR 
IMPEACHMENT 
PURPOSES WHEN 
THE PROBATIVE 
VALUE OF THE 
EVIDENCE 
OUTWEIGHS THE 
PREJUDICIAL 
EFFECT. 
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
In Jackson v. State, 
340 Md. 705, 668 A.2d 8 
(1995), the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland held that admitting a 
similar prior conviction to im-
peach an accused's testimony 
is within the trial court's discre-
tion and not per se inadmissible 
if the probative value of the 
evidence outweighs any unfair 
prejudice to the defendant. The 
court also enumerated several 
factors that the trial judge should 
consider when balancing the 
probative value of the evidence 
against its prejudicial effect. In 
so holding, the court stressed 
the importance of the balancing 
requirement but left to the trial 
court's discretion the manner in 
which this is accomplished. 
Robert M. Jackson 
("Jackson") was convicted of 
theft of$300 or more for steal-
ing a computer from Lombard 
Hall at the University of Mary-
land. At trial, Edward White 
("White"), a housekeeper, tes-
tified that he admitted Jackson 
to Lombard Hall at 5:30 p.m. 
and that Jackson returned to the 
building again at 6:00 p.m. At 
that time, White noticed that 
two University recycling boxes 
were missing. Later, White saw 
Jackson standing next to the 
missing boxes, which contained 
the computers. Jackson ex-
plained to White that he was 
taking the computers home to 
do work for his supervisor. 
White subsequently 
identified Jackson as the person 
who removed the computers. 
When the police arri ved at Jack-
son's home, they observed Jack-
son in an alley discarding boxes 
bearing the University emblem. 
The police arrested and charged 
Jackson with one count oftheft 
of $300 or more. 
Before trial in the Cir-
cuit Court for Baltimore City, 
Jackson filed a motion in limine 
to exclude evidence of two pri-
or thefts in 1991. Although 
Jackson received probation be-
fore judgment for the first theft, 
he was convicted for the sec-
ond. In response to Jackson's 
motion in limine, the trial court 
excluded the evidence of the 
probation before judgment. As 
to the conviction, the trial court 
stated that if Jackson testified, 
then the prior theft conviction 
would be admissible to impeach 
him under Maryland Rule of 
Evidence 5-609, because the 
probative value outweighed the 
prejudicial effect. When Jack-
son portrayed himself as a "stel-
lar" individual on direct, the 
prosecutor introduced the prior 
conviction as impeachment ev-
idence on cross-examination. 
The jury convicted 
Jackson and the judge sentenced 
him to five years imprisonment. 
Jackson appealed to the Court 
of Special Appeals of Mary-
land. Prior to consideration by 
the intermediate appellate 
court, the court of appeals is-
sued a writ of certiorari to de-
termine whether the trial judge 
abused her discretion by admit-
ting a prior theft conviction to 
impeach the credibility of a de-
fendant charged with theft. 
The court of appeals 
began its analysis with an his-
torical overview of the rules 
governing the admission of pri-
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or convictions for impeachment 
purposes. At common law, a 
person was considered incom-
petent to testify after being con-
victed of an infamous crime or 
a crime involving dishonesty. 
Jackson, 340 Md. at 711-12, 
668 A.2d at 11 (citing State v. 
Giddens, 335 Md. 205, 214, 
642 A.2d 870, 874 (1994); 
Prout v. State, 311 Md. 348, 
359,535 A.2d445,450 (1988)). 
In 1864, the Legislature re-
moved this disqualification and 
stated that such a person could 
testify, but the prior conviction 
was admissible for impeach-
ment purposes. Jackson 340 
Md. at 712,668 A.2d at 11-12 
(citing Prout v. State, 311 Md. 
348, 359, 535 A.2d 445, 450 
(1988)). 
Presently, Maryland 
Rule of Evidence 5-609 con-
trols the admission of prior con-
victions for impeachment pur-
poses. The rule states, in perti-
nent part, that prior convictions 
may be elicited from a witness 
or by public record if: (1) it was 
for an infamous crime or a crime 
relevant to the witness's credi-
bility; and (2) the conviction is 
less than fifteen years old; and 
(3) the court finds that the pro-
bative value of the evidence as 
to credibility outweighs the dan-
ger of unfair prejudice to the 
defendant. Id. at 712-13, 668 
A.2d at 12. 
Addressing Jackson's 
motion to exclude all prior con-
victions similar to the crime 
charged, the court rejected the 
defendant's arguments for three 
reasons. Id. at 714,668 A.2d at 
12-13. First, Rule 5-609 does 
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not contain explicit language 
excluding similar prior convic-
tions. Second, a per se bar on 
admissibility of such statements 
would deny trial judges needed 
flexibility in particular cases. 
Finally, such a rule would un-
fairly shield a defendant who 
specializes in certain crimes 
from cross-examination con-
cerning this specialty. Id. at 
714,668 A.2d 13. 
Next, the court recog-
nized that although a defendant 
has the right to testify in his 
own defense, the State also has 
the right to impeach the defen-
dant with prior convictions if 
the evidence will assist the 
factfinder in assessing the de-
fendant's credibility. Id. (cit-
ing Ricketts v. State, 291 Md. 
701, 703, 436 A.2d 906, 908 
(1981 )). The balancing of the 
probative value of the evidence 
against the unfair prejudice to 
the defendant imposes a limita-
tion on the use of prior convic-
tions in order to avoid the ad-
mission of such evidence sole-
ly to create a negative impres-
sion of the accused. Id. at 716, 
668 A.2d at 13. This require-
ment is particularly important 
when the prior conviction is 
similar to or identical to that 
presently charged, because a 
prior conviction may suggest to 
the jury that the defendant com-
mitted the present crime. Id. 
Due to this tendency, the trial 
judge must weigh the legiti-
mate probative value against 
unfair prejudice to the defen-
dant. Id. at716,668A.2dat 14. 
Since Rule 5-609 was 
partially derived from Federal 
Rule of Evidence 609, the court 
looked to federal case law for 
guidance in interpreting the 
balancing prong ofthe rule. The 
court of appeals discussed the 
factors that the federal courts 
developed to guide trial judges 
in weighing the probative value 
against unfair prejudice. Id. at 
717,668 A.2d at 14. 
The seventh circuit has 
established five factors for trial 
judges to consider when bal-
ancing probative value against 
unfair prejudice. Id. (citing 
United States v. Mahone, 537 
F.2d 922, 929 (7th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 429 U.S. 1025 (1976)). 
The factors are: "( 1) the im-
peachment value of the prior 
crime[,] (2) the point in time of 
the conviction and the defen-
dant's subsequent history[,] (3) 
the similarity between the past 
crime and the charged crime[,] 
(4) the importance of the defen-
dant's testimony[,] and (5) the 
centrality of the defendant's 
credibility." Id. 
Upon approving the us-
age of the Mahone factors, the 
Court of Appeals of Maryland 
cautioned that the factors should 
not be considered in isolation 
of each other by the trial courts 
when balancing probative val-
ue against prejudicial effect. 
The court urged trial judges to 
explain the specific factors or 
considerations used in the deci-
sion. Id. 
Applying these factors 
to the case at bar, the court of 
appeals determined that the ev-
idence should be admitted be-
cause four of the five factors 
weighed in favor of admission 
of Jackson's prior theft convic-
tion. First, theft is inherently 
dishonest and reflects adverse-
lyon the witness's honesty. Id. 
at 721-22, 668 A.2d at 16. Sec-
ond, the conviction was less 
than three years old, as opposed 
to more remote in time. Id. 
Third, since Jackson's credibil-
ity was central to the case, it 
was important to allow the State 
to present evidence of similar 
prior convictions for impeach-
ment purposes. Id. The factor 
pertaining to the similarity of 
the charged offense to the prior 
conviction, however, weighed 
against admissibility because of 
the potential harm to the defen-
dant. Id. at 720-21,668 A.2d at 
16. 
Since the defendant in 
the instant case presented him-
self as a "stellar" individual, 
the court noted it would have 
been extremely unfair not to 
allow this image to remain un-
challenged. Id. at 722,668 A.2d 
at 16. Furthermore, the court 
stressed that the trial court lim-
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ited the prejudice by instruct-
ing the jury to consider the ev-
idence only for evaluating Jack-
son's credibility and the State 
did not attempt to misuse the 
evidence by overemphasizing 
the prior conviction. Id. In 
sum, since the court found that 
credibility was central to the 
case and that the probative val-
ue of the evidence outweighed 
the prejudicial effect, it con-
cluded that the trial court did 
not abuse its discretion in ad-
mitting the prior conviction. Id. 
In a dissenting opinion, 
Judge Bell disagreed with the 
majority's use of the Mahone 
factors and stated that they pro-
vided a "road map" for trial 
judges to find "infamous crimes 
and crimes affecting credibility 
per se admissible." Id. at 727, 
668 A.2d at 19. In particular, 
Judge Bell gave more weight to 
the third factor, similarity ofthe 
conviction to the crime charged, 
leading to the cOl1clusion that 
the probative value of the evi-
dence did not outweigh its prej-
udicial impact. Id. at 733, 668 
A.2d at 22. 
In ho lding that evidence 
of prior convictions similar to 
those presently charged are not 
per se inadmissible, the Court 
of Appeals of Maryland in Jack-
son v. State emphasized the fun-
damental necessity of balanc-
ing the probative value of the 
evidence against the prejudi-
cial effect. In a trial where 
credibility is central to the case 
and the probative value out-
weighs the prejudicial effect, a 
prior conviction of a similar 
crime may be admitted into ev-
idence for impeachment pur-
poses. The court further urged 
that trial judges should state, on 
the record, the specific factors 
or considerations employed 
when balancing the probative 
value against unfair prejudice, 
in order to insure efficient ap-
pellate review. 
- Michele L. Katz 
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